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The objectives of this paper are to account for the
rise and fall of the FRN and evaluate its future prospects
in Hong Kong.
To promote a deeper understanding of the FRN as a
financial instrument, the study also includes an
investigation into its pricing technicalities, issuing
procedure, trading mechanism, and borrowing and investment
considerations.
While emphasis is given to the Hong Kong market,
developments in the other markets are also briefly covered
because the local market tends to be seriously affected by
what is happening around the world.
In the past two decades, the FRN in the world markets
flourished under a rising interest rate environment, a
search for good quality and liquid assets after the
international debt crisis, the world-wide trend of debt
securitization, and changing banking regulations.
The FRN was introduced into Hong Kong when the local
economy began to emerge as a major international financial
centre. On top of the international popularity of the
instrument, other factors such as the high growth of the
local economy, the promotion of FRNs by banks as disguised
loans to get customers, and corporate borrowers' desire to
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diversify borrowings have all contributed to the rising
importance of the FRN in Hong Kong.
World markets for FRNs declined as a result of low
interest rates, over-supply of paper, changing banking
regulations, risk reassessment of perpetuals, and the
worsening of the international debt crisis. The Hong Kong
market was additionally stricken by a saturation of demand
and the artificially low interest rates due to the pegging
of the Hong Kong dollar to the weakening US dollar.
The long-term development of the FRN in Hong Kong is
limited by a number of infrastructural constraints.
Although this instrument will show some sign of revival if
investors' confidence can be restored and interest rates
begin to rise, no substantial breakthrough is expected
unless there emerges a more favourable financial
infrastructure in Hong Kong.
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The world financial markets have been undergoing
revolutionary changes since the late seventies and early
eighties. During this period we witnessed an increasing
trend towards securitization, deregulation, and
internationalization happening in many major financial
centres in the world. These important changes, to a large
extent, were brought about by an increasingly
interdependent international economy and a higher degree
of sophistication in the financial systems supported by
professional financial executives and advanced
communication systems.
In this increasingly challenging arena, financial
institutions, in an attempt to meet customers' changing
demands and survive under the keener and keener
competition, have been busy turning out innovations and
attaching 'bells and whistles' to their traditional
instruments to enhance attractiveness or even introduce
entirely new concepts. However, as a result of the
increasingly volatile situation in the international
economic and financial scene, these innovations seem to
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have relatively short lives and tend to flourish and
decline in an abrupt manner. One good example that
illustrates this phenomenon is the Floating Rate Note
(FRN).
Although the FRN was introduced in 1970 in the
Eurobond market, the issuance volume at that time was only
US$300 million, occupying 10.8% of the total issuance
volume of international bonds. It did not occupy a
substantial portion until 1978, when FRN volume amounted
to US$2.3 billion, sharing 19.1% of the international bond
issues. Thereafter it continued to increase up to its peak
of US$55.9 billion in 1985. In 1986 the issuance volume
dropped slightly to US$47.8 billion. But starting from
late 1986, the situation worsened drastically, especially
in the perpetual sector of FRN, which virtually collapsed.
For 1987, only US$12.0 billion of FRN were issued.
A similar trend is observed in the Hong Kong Dollar
FRN market. In 1984, there was only one FRN issue of
HK$500 million. The number of issues increased to four in
1985, while total volume also jumped to HK$1,760 million.
It reached the peak in 1986 when there were. altogether
seven issues with a volume of HK$3,850 million. The
market declined very quickly in 1987, which ended up with
only one FRN issue of HK$400 million.
Several issues follow from the above observations:
What has happened to' cause the decline of the market? Why
did it originally flourish? Will the FRN 'revive'? These
are the major topics of our research.
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More specifically, it is hoped that this study may
promote a better understanding.of the following:
(1) the concept of FRN and the technical mechanism about
this kind of instrument
(2) the environmental considerations for borrowers,
intermediaries, and investors related to issuing and
trading bf FRNs
(3) the factors which contributed to the flourishing of
FRNs
(4) the factors which caused its downturn
(5) the future prospects for this kind of instrument.
Scope of the Study
This study is largely conducted with the Hong Kong
context in mind, although international situations, which
may be closely related to local developments, will also be
briefly mentioned. The period covered by this study will
be from 1984 to March 1988.
Methodology
The research is typically qualitative and exploratory
in nature. Although a more vigorous or quantitative
approach is theoretically possible, the sizeable time and
information resources required prohibit the adoption of
such methods.
The data for the study was mainly collected through
the following sources:
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(1) Secondary Data Sources
These sources include financial textbooks, research




Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin
Financial Market Trends
(2) Primary Data Sources
Primary data was mainly obtained through interviews
with local investment bankers and corporate borrowers.
Seventeen relevant institutions were selected and
approached. Five of them granted us interviews and one
answered our questions and gave comments by telephone. One
other institution did not grant us an interview but sent
us relevant information. Appendix 2 gives a list of our
interviewees.
Limitations of the Study
It is. conceivable that borrowers, bankers, and
investors may have different perspectives on the -issues
addressed by this study. In addition, different segments
within each of these three groups may also look upon the
same issue from different angles. Therefore, ideally our
sample should represent a well balanced mix in terms of
these groups as well as their subsegments. However, the
time constraints and the uncontrollability of the response
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pattern inhibited us from undertaking a comprehensive and
balanced study. Nevertheless, because of the relative
informational efficiency of the financial sector and the
willingness of some institutions to help, the shortcomings




In brief, a FRN can be defined as a debt security
issued for a medium or long term maturity, with a rate of
interest that moves with a certain chosen reference rate.
FRNs issued by Hong Kong borrowers tend to have the
following characteristics:
(1) Maturity
Normally maturities range from five to ten years.
(2) Currency
Most of the FRNs issued by Hong Kong borrowers were
in Hong Kong dollars. However, there have been issues
denominated in US dollars and Deutschemarks as well.
(3) Rate of Interest
Usually the interest rate is adjusted every 1,3 or 6
months based on the Hong Kong' Interbank Offer
Rate(HIBOR) plus a margin. In some cases, the London
Interbank Offer Rate(LIBOR) was used.
(4) Amount Per Issue
The amount per issue was generally around HK$500
million, with a range varying from two hundred
million to one billion.
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(5) Denomination
Most Hong Kong dollar FRNs were issued in
denominations of HK$500,000 each.
(6) Margin Over Reference Rate
Margins of 1/8% to 1/4% were most typical, but the
margin could go down to 1/16% in some cases.
Innovations Attached to FRN
Although a large portion of the WRNS issueu are in
classic form as described above, there are still many
innovations attached. The major hybrids of FRNs are
summarized below.
(1) Mismatch FRNs
Usually a FRN will fix its coupon with the basic
reference rate at the beginning of a particular period and
pay the coupon at the end of it. In contrast, a mismatch
FRN would ref ix its coupon several times with the
reference rate during the period. For example, Sun Hung
Kai Properties has issued a-mismatch FRN in September
1987. The issuance was arranged by Paribas- Asia and
Canadian Eastern Finance with the interest rate equal to
3-month HIBOR+ 1/16%. Although the coupon will be
payable for every 3 months, it will be ref ixed*monthly.
(2) Floor FRNs, Capped FRNs and Mini-max FRNs
These three types of FRNs would restrict the amount
of coupon to a certain range. The Floor FRNs are issued
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with a minimum coupon while the Capped FRNs nave a maximum
coupon. In addition, the Mini-max FRNs would specify both
the minimum and maximum rate of interest. For example,
the Mass Transit Railway Corporation has issued a Mini-max
FRN in April, 1986. The interest rate would be 3-month
HIBOR +.1/4% with a-maximum of 12% and a minimum of 7.5%.
(3) Perpetual FRNs
These are FRNs with no final maturity. The first
issue was introduced in May 1984 by National Westminister
Bank with a coupon fixing of 6-month LIBOR+ 3/8%.
(4) Floating/Fixed Rate Notes
These are innovations which allow the FRNs to be
converted to fixed rate bonds under certain conditions.
Two types of- mechanisms have been designed for this
transformation. The first one is automatic conversion in
which the interest rate of the FRN would be floating until
a certain level of short-term interest is* reached. Once
this trigger rate is achieved, the FRN would automatically
convert to a *fixed rate bond with the interest rate
locked at this level-until final maturity. The second
mechanism is to allow the noteholders to'have.an option to
convert their FRNs into fixed rate bonds.
(5) Bull FRNs
This innovation has been applied by the MTRC in July,
1986. The corporation issued one series of conventional
FRNs with a coupon of 3-month HIBOR+ 1/8%, and another
series of 'Bull' issue with a coupon of 17% minus 3-month
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HIBOR. Therefore, the investors could have an option in
investing as a fixed rate bonds by buying equal amounts
of the two series.
(6) Other Variations
There are still many minor innovations attached to
FRNs in addition to the above-mentioned. Some FRNs fix
and pay the coupon monthly or even weekly instead of
every three or six months. The reference may be Treasury
Bill rates instead of LIBOR, LIMEAN or LIBID. It is also
common to incorporate a put or call option in the FRN
issues.
issuing and Trading of FRNs
Issuing Procedure
The issuing of FRNs in Hong kong is similar to that
of the Eurobond market. However, a prospectus is required
in Hong Kong for the issuing of FRNs.
When a-borrower wants to launch a new FRN, it will
first ask a financial institution to act as the. 'lead
manager'. This financial institution will be responsible
for the administration of the issue and for securing a
syndicate of other institutions to support the issue.
Sometimes the borrower may wish to have several lead
managers.
The lead manager would then invite a group of co-
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managers to form a syndicate with him to underwrite the
whole issue. Upon formation of the syndicate, the
issuance would be announced to the public. The lead
manager may also form a group of underwriters in addition
to the co-managers. These underwriters do not participate
as managers but only to sub-underwrite the issue.
Moreover, sometimes an additional selling group would be
included to ensure as wide a distribution of the issue as
possible. This selling group is usually composed of
smaller financial institutions who wish to participate in
the issue but do not have the capacity to underwrite
larger amounts of FRNs.
The fees of the issue include the management and
underwriting fees, and the selling commission. The co-
managers would receive underwriting-and management fees
according to their degree of participation. The
underwriters receive underwriting fees on their secondary
underwriting. The selling group together with the co-
managers and underwriters would be alloted FRNs at a
discount equal to the selling commission. In addition,.
the lead managers would also be entitled an extra share or
praecipium of the management and underwriting fees to
cover its additional costs for preparing the issue.
The selling period usually lasts for 1-3 weeks from
the day of the launch. Then all lead managers and co-
managers will attend the signing ceremony and sign the
subscription agreement. Approximately ten days after the
signing ceremony, the syndicate members have to pay the
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lead managers for their allotments of the FRN. Usually
the closing ceremony at which the lead manager hands over
the money to the borrower follows later in the day. This
date is known as the paying and closing date.
After the closing ceremony the lead manager would
publish a 'tombstone' in the main newspapers which
announces to the public at large that the securities have
been sold. The 'tombstone' also lists the members of the
management group according to the sizes of their
underwriting.
Trading Mechanism
The Eurobond Market for FRNs has no central buying
and selling venue, and is not housed in a market place
although most of them are listed on a Stock Exchange,
usually in London or Luxemburg. The trading is mostly
conducted either by telephone, telex, VDU or similar
technology. Market levels are established by traders
checking prices with each other. Usually, a market maker
is expected to make two-way prices, a price for a bid and
an offer as standard. Prices are normally quoted on a 5-
10 basis point (hundredths of one per cent) spread. The
transactions are usually cleared through two central
clearing systems- Euroclear in Brussels and Cedel in
Luxemburg.
In Hong Kong, 'FRNs are usually not listed on the
Stock Exchange. The liquidity of the FRN is very low and
the number of market makers is small. There is no central
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clearing system for transactions, and most of the
settlements are in the form of physical delivery.
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Chapter III
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO ISSUING
AND INVESTING IN RNS
Considerations of Borrowers
Floating Rate vs Fixed Rate Borrowings
Borrowers are often confronted with the choice
between borrowing by selling fixed rate or floating rate
bonds. Even after this decision has been made, there are
also many different types of fixed and floating rate
instruments available to them. In this chapter, we will
try to examine the major considerations of a borrower in
raising funds.
The yield curve would definitely be a very- important
consideration for investors, but its effect on borrowers'
decisions is not very great. The choice between fixed rate
or floating rate funding would largely depend on the
financial objectives of the borrower. For example, the
financing of many corporate borrowers is often linked to
specific projects. In this case, fixed rate bonds would
have an advantage over floating rate notes in letting the
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borrower know the cost of funds with certainty. Banks
sometimes require fixed rate financing for their long-term
fixed investments. In general,
borrowers do not decide to tap the floating rate
or the fixed rate markets on the basis of a
speculative view of the cheapest market. They
tend to approach them*as complementary markets if
they themselves are interested in those markets.1
We could use the remarK by Mr. Moss, the r'inance
Director of Mass Transit Railway Corporation to sum up the
aoroach of many borrowers2:
The Corporation constantly reviews its financing
strategies and fine-tunes its preferred debt
profile, in the light of market environment, to
optimize its risk exposure while minimizing its
finance costs.
Comparisons Between Different Ways of Financing
In this section, we will discuss the choice between
the FRN and other floating rate instruments.
Specifically, we will compare the differences between the
FRN and one of its main alternatives- syndicated loans.
Both are important ways of medium-term financing.
Syndicated loans are bank medium-term loans granted to a
borrower at rates of interest that fluctuate in accordance
with the interbank rates for the maturities-for which they
are used. The FRN and syndicated loan can be compared
along the following dimensions: flexibility, liquidity,




The structure of a FRN is predetermined, and once
issued it will not allow any future variation. This also
applies to syndicated loans once the contract is' signed.
However, the negotiable nature of the syndicated loan
agreement has made it more flexible than the FRN.
Syndicated loans usually have a drawdown period in
which borrowers could draw the loans according to their
specific financial needs. That means they could have the
necessary fundings whenever they need them during the
drawdown period. On the contrary, the issuing of the FRN
only allow borrowers to receive the full amount on a
specific' single date against the delivery of the notes.
Therefore, FRN borrowers are not flexible in deciding the
amount and date of fundings. However, this lack of
flexibility in the FRN has eliminated any sort of
commission, such as the commitment fees or facility fees,
covering the undrawn portions of the whole amount of the
facility.
As FRNs are usually issued in bearer form, the number
of interest payments must be predetermined, and the number
of coupons be consistent with these interest payfiients.
Furthermore, the periodicity of the interest payments has
to be fixed initially in order to ensure the comparability
of the notes and their common marketability. Therefore,
the flexibility of borrowers in periodicity of interest
payments and consequently his borrowings is limited. On
the other hand, a syndicated loan would allow several
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maturities and it is common to authorize a choice for the
borrower between three- and six-month borrowing, on the
basis of his needs or in view of prevailing interest rate
differentials. Of course, a mis-matched FRN is a way to
improve this flexibility by fixing the interest rate at
different dates, but still the periodicity of the coupon
cannot be altered.
Both FRNs and syndicated loans would have similar
features in redemption. A syndicated loan agreement
would allow the borrower to repay whole or part' of the
debt before final maturity. On the other hand, the
incorporation of call options in the FRN has also allowed
borrowers to redeem all or part of the financing before
final maturity. However, there is one main difference
between the two. For the FRN, once an amount is repaid,
there is no way to borrow the money back again. In
contrast, the standby clause in a syndicated loan would
allow the borrower to borrow the money again.
Syndicated loans also have an additional flexibility
in currency over the FRN. The multi-currency clause
contained in many syndicated loan agreements allows the
borrowers to draw currencies other than the currency in
which the loan is denominated. On the contrary, once a
FRN is issued, the currency received by the borrowers
cannot be altered.
To conclude, the syndicated loan is a more flexible
way of financing than the FRN. Therefore, the FRN will be




Borrowers are not as concerned as investors about the
liquidity or marketability of the debt instruments.
However, liquidity is important to borrowers when the FRN
is combined with a sinking fund. It is easier for a
borrower to redeem the bonds especially when the notes are
traded below par. In contrast, syndicated loans are much
more illiquid than FRNs.
(3) Procedures and Documentation
Both issuing FRN and arranging syndicated loans are
complex tasks. A prospectus is usually required for FRN
issues. The main purpose of the prospectus is to give
information about the issue it also serves as an
marketing and financial advertising instrument. The
composition, printing, packaging and posting of several
thousand copies of a prospectus require a lot of time,
money and attention. Therefore, some borrowers prefer the
simplified procedure of the loan market where standard
documentation is given only to the members of the
syndicate.
However, a syndicated loan has more complex
underwriting or subscription agreements, agreements among
managers, and agency agreements than a FRN issue as the
terms and conditions of the FRN issue have already given
in the prospectus and are also printed on the notes.
The FRN also requires preparation, circulation and
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issuance of bearer notes. Moreover, many procedures and
considerable documentation are required to list a FRN on
the stock exchange. In contrast, the above two types of
procedures and documentation are unnecessary for
syndicated loans.
(4) Fees and Expenses
Since different FRN issues and syndicated loan
agreements would have different expenses, it may be
difficult to compare them in general. However, according
to an estimate by Ugeux4, the comparative expenses of an
FRN issue and a syndicated loan arrangement for a US$100
million operation are $110,000 and $55,000 respectively.
This figure includes only the expenses to third parties
and not the commissions and fees paid to the syndicate.
The important point is that the total expense of a FRN
issue is roughly double that for a loan of the same
amount.
In addition to the above expenses, the commissions
and fees paid to the managers, underwriters and sellers of
a FRN issue are approximately 0.5% flat. The fees for
syndicated loans are roughly the same as those for a FRN.
In the case of syndicated loans, there are also
annual commissions which include the commitment fee and
facility fee. These are fees to remunerate the commitment
taken by the lending institution if and when the loan is
not drawn.
Lastly we would also consider the cost of agents.
For syndicated loans,. the basic remuneration of the agent
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is a lump sum paid for the entire life of the loan, which
covers the costs of determining the interest rate,
informing participating banks, and paying principal and
interest. On the contrary, the cost of the agent for a
FRN is not a lump sum as for syndicated loans since extra
services such as publishing the applicable interest rates
in newspapers are required for every period.
(5) Comparing Costs
Although it may be difficult to compare, Ugeux5 has
attempted to sum up the various costs to be added to the
spread in percentage terms for both the FRN and the
syndicated loan. The differential between these two is
0.25%. With the average spread of 3/8% for syndicated
loans and 1/8% for FRN, it is apparent that FRN is a
cheaper way of financing than syndicated loans.
(6) Amounts
Although the amount of FRN issue size has been
increasing, it is not likely that it will replace the
multi-billion dollar syndicated loan market. Therefore,
the syndicated loan would still be more suitable for
smaller amounts or extremely large amounts than FRN.
(7) Maturities
The maturities of FRNs have lengthened dramatically
over the past years, and maturities of ten to fourteen
years are common in current the FRN market. Therefore,
the FRN would have an advantage over syndicated loans in
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having a longer maturity.
In conclusion, there are both pros and cons for FRN
in raising funds as compared to syndicated loans. FRNs
have advantages in liquidity, costs and maturities. On the
other hand, the strengths of syndicated loans lie in
flexibility, simpler procedures and documentation, lower
fees and expenses, and amounts. In general, each
borrower's decisions should depend on his.own objectives.
Considerations of Investors
The considerations of investors in FRNs are quite
similar to those of borrowers. For example, liquidity is
one of the most important concerns for both investors and
borrowers. In this section we will concentrate on the
considerations that make an investor choose the FRN
instead of other instruments.6 However, it is necessary
to distinguish between investors who treat FRNs as a
short-term investment and those who take a long-term view
on investing in FRNs.
FRNs as Short-term Investments
There are five main considerations that will` affect
the decisions of borrowers. These include certainty,
profitability, flexibility, denominations and the nature
of investors and borrowers. However, it is necessary to
keep in mind that these considerations are not
independent but rather are interrelated with each other.
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For example, higher certainty would usually imply lower
profitability.
By investing in FRNs, the investor will be faced with
more risk than investing in comparable instruments such as
Floating Rate Certificates of Deposit(FRCD) and bank
deposits. Short-term bank deposits ensure that the
investor will get back all his deposit at par at
maturities. In contrast, since the FRN is usually a
medium- to long-term investment, the short-term investor
will sell it before final maturities, and the selling
price is not necessarily equal to the purchase price.
Therefore, investors in FRNs are subject to risk on the
principal of the investment. Investors in FRCD would also
be subject to this risk, but it is smaller than FRN as the
maturities of FRCD are usually shorter than those of FRN
and are thus closer to the investment horizon.
FRNs normally have higher rates of interest than bank
deposits and FRCD. The interest rates applicable to bank
deposits will usually depend on the amount of the deposit.
The larger the amount, the closer will be the interest
rate to the interbank bid rate. It is rare for the
interest rates on bank deposits to exceed the interbank
bid rate. On the contrary, the FRN.usually carries an
interest rate with a spread above the offer rates, and
thus is higher than. those of bank deposits. The spread
for a FRCD is also lower than that of a FRN. In general,
the return on a FRN is-higher than that on similar short-
term instruments., For example, the return of Eurodollar
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FRNs for period 1978 to 1983 was 13.7%, while it was only
13.0% for Eurodeposits and 12.7% for Euro CDs.
Flexibility is also an important consideration for
investors. Bank deposits are flexible in terms of the
range of different maturities available to investors.
However, once the maturity is chosen, it cannot be
modified without a penalty. In contrast, the FRN's
flexibility comes from its marketability. Whenever an
investor requires money for unexpected reasons, he could
sell the notes in the secondary market. Therefore, he has
more flexibility in determining the length of the
investment. In this aspect, the FRCD has no merit over
the FRN as both instruments have well-developed secondary
markets.
Bank deposits are available in all denominations, but
only large amounts would enable investors to enjoy an
interest rate close to the interbank rate. FRNs could be
acquired in small denominations as low as US$1,000 in the
secondary market. Therefore for small denominations of
investment, it will be easier to obtain the market rate by
investing in FRN than in bank deposits. The denominations
of FRCD are usually US$500,000 minimum, and the trading of
each transaction amount to several millions dollars.
Consequently, the amount required for investing in FRCD is
higher than that of FRN.
The nature of investors also affects the decisions.
Large corporations and institutional investors would be
able to obtain the interbank rate on bank deposits, and so
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the FRN has less appeal to them. Besides, some investors
prefer FRNs over FRCD because of the issuance of totally
anonymous and easily transferable bearer securities. In
addition, some FRNs are issued by corporate and sovereign
borrowers while all FRCDs are issued by financial
institutions. Therefore, FRNs could allow investors to
choose among different types of borrowers. This feature
would attract investors who like to limit their risk
exposure to financial institutions.
FRNs as Long-term Investments
The considerations in selecting a financial
instrument for long-term investment are somewhat more
complicated. The first question is whether a fixed rate
or a floating rate instrument should be bought.
Unfortunately, there is no definite way to answer this
question. It is always possible to find periods when
fixed rate investments were better than floating rate
investments and vice versa. Therefore, the decisions
should be based on the appropriate timing of the
investment and also the expectation of trends of long-term
and short-term interest rates.
The financial objectives of an investor would also
affect his decisions. Different types of investors have
different financial objectives. For example, an individual
investor may only look for income rather than return and
prefer a fixed income stream which enables him to plan his
expenditures against a precise forecast of future income.
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Furthermore, it may be difficult for an individual
investor to understand the complex mechanisms of FRNs.
This individual will therefore choose fixed income bonds
instead of FRNs. Another example is the holding of FRNs
by mutual funds for liquidity reasons.
For banks, the reasons for holding FRNs as long-term
investments are numerous. The profitability of FRNs is
usually smaller than that of syndicated loans. The other
motivation for banks to hold FRNs would be the
marketability of FRNs as bank assets. Therefore the bank
will be in a more liquid position than if it were holding
syndicated loans.
Notes:
1. See Floating Rate Notes by Georges Ugeux, p. 127
2. See Financial Opportunities in World Capital Markets
by C. R. Moss, p.12
3. Discussion based on Floating Rate Notes by Georges
Ugeux, Ch.5
4. See Floating Rate Notes by Georges Ugeux, p.66
5. See Floating Rate Notes by Georges Ugeux, p.67




PRICING OF A FRN
The FRN is a very active instrument traded in the
Eurobond market. One main consideration of investors in
the market is the price of FRN. In this chapter, we will
consider how a FRN is priced in the primary market and
secondary market.
Primary Market
This is the issuing price of the FRN, and it is
measured by the effective spread. Based upon the
prevailing conditions in the money markets and also the
terms of the issue, the borrowers would try to set a
minimum price that will attract the investors' interest in
buying the new issues.
The important point is that the initial distribution
would determine partly the level at which the FRN would be
quoted during the life of the issue. If the issuing price
for a FRN is too high and it does not attract investors,
large inventories of the new issue would be in the hands
of the managers, co-managers and underwriters. Therefore
the prices of the FRN in the secondary market would be
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depressed, and will not rise until most of the notes have
left the hands of the syndicate.
Secondary Market
FRNs are traded in the secondary market by traders
checking offer and bid prices with each other.
Therefore, the price of a FRN is formed by competitive
bidding. The rest of this chapter will concentrate on the
factors that influence the market participants' decisions
in making offer and bid prices.
Short-term Interest Rates
The level of short-term interest rates could be
regarded as the main determinant of FRN prices in the
secondary market. When a trader buys a FRN, the level of
short-term interest rates serves as a measure of the
opportunity cost of holding the FRN until the next coupon
fixing day. Therefore, the FRN prices would have
different behaviours under periods of rising or declining
interest rates.
The following hypothetical example shows how a rising
short-term interest rate affects the evolution of FRN
prices.' It is assumed that on the day of interest rate
change, the coupon of a FRN was fixed at 10.125%
representing 6-month LIBOR at 10%+ 0.125% spread. The FRN
was traded at par, i.e. 100% on the*same day. Under the
assumptions of all other things remaining constant, we
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could see how the prices change.
If the 6-month LIBOR after one month is 10.25%, then
at what price would the holder of the notes be willing to
sell? The holder would sell his notes provided he can get
the same return for his investment. If he keeps the
notes, he could get 10.125% for the six-month period. On
the other hand, he could also buy a newly priced FRN with
coupon fixed at 10.375% representing 6-month LIBOR at
10.25%+ 0.125% spread. By doing this, he gains the
difference of the two coupons, i.e. 0.25% for the next
five months. Therefore, the selling price for him would
be the price that make him indifferent between the two
alternatives.
The selling price could be calculated under a simple
arithmetic formula as belows:
where S= selling price
CC.= current coupon
NC= new coupon
m= number of months remaining for the current
coupon
PP= actual purchase price
Substituting the values in the formula, we have
Therefore, the holder would be willing to sell the
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notes only when price is not less than 99.896%. For the
potential purchaser, he will make the same calculation as
the holder. He tries to evaluate the price at which he
should purchase the FRNs at the current coupons, to
compensate for the loss he is making by not entering into
an FRN issue offering a new coupon under the prevailing
conditions. Therefore, he would be willing to purchase the
notes only when prices are not greater than 99.896%. To
conclude, if everything remains constant and there is no
third party to interfere with the market, the seller and
buyer would reach an agreement at about 99.896%, and this
would be the market price.
Banks are important players in the secondary market,
and their viewpoint on FRN prices may be somewhat
different from other investors. They consider FRNs not
from the yield point of view, but rather from the spread
point of view. So they will sell or buy FRNs in order to
maximize the spread. In calculating their offer and bid
prices, we require their corresponding cost of financing.
In this example, if the banks.' five-month borrowing cost
is 10.5%, then the purchase price could be computed as
follows:
there FC is the cost of financing.
Therefore, the purchase price for a FRN would be
Lower for banks than ordinary'noteholders, providing the
post of financing is higher than the newly fixed coupon of
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a FRN, i.e. the yield curve is negative.
With the interference of banks, the actual price of
the FRN will lie between 99.896% and 99.844%,'depending on
the comparative weight and nature of supply and demand.
The above example is clearly over-simplified. It
assumes both the new and old FRNs are traded at the same
level on the interest date, i.e. at par in this case. For
simplicity, we will stick to this simple formula although
the formula could be modified to incorporate these price
differences.
With the assumption of rising interest rates and
using the above formula, the FRN prices would be evolved
as shown in the Table 4.1:
Table 4.1 Evolution of Market Prices of an FRN issue
under Rising Interest Rate
Months Cost of Selling Banks'







With the continuous increase in short-term interest
rates and the replacement of the inverse yield curve by a
flat one, the banks' and investors' selling prices would
coincide at 99.5% after three months. We could see that
the impact of the rising interest rate is tempered by the
fact that a greater portion of the interest period has
elapsed. Therefore, the prices will first fall and then
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rise. The graph in Appendix 2 shows this phenomenon.
The evolution of FRN prices under declining interest
rates would be the opposite of that under rising interest
rates. Under the same line of reasoning, we could have
figures in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2 Evolution of Market Prices of an FRN issue
under Declining Interest Rate
Months Cost of Selling Banks'
Remaining Financing LIBOR Prices(S) Prices(P)







The above example demonstrates how short-term
interest rates would affect the FRN prices. Some empirical
evidence has been found to support the above hypothesis.2
This further indicates that an,important part of the FRN
trading is on a short-term basis. However, the formula
used in the above example is over-simplified. There are
numerous advanced techniques to evaluate a FRN.. In the
following section, we introduce two examples of them.
(1) Adjusted Simple Margin (ASM)
For a new FRN issue which have not yet received their
first coupon, and secondary FRN•s when they are traded flat




S= spread over LIBOR
Y= number of years to maturity or first put option
This formula amortizes the premium over par or the
discount below par over the life of the notes and then
adds the spread over LIBOR at which the coupon is fixed.
However, if the FRN in question already carries a coupon,
then the calculation has to take into account the value of
the coupon compared with the cost of funding. With this
modification, the formula changes to:
where C= current coupon
L= LIBOR for remaining period to the next
coupon payment date
d= number of days from settlement date to the
next coupon payment date
(2) Discount Margin
This evaluation tries to discount each cash flow at
an assumed LIBOR rate. The discount rate is the assumed
LIBOR plus the discounted margin. The discounted margin
can be interpreted as a margin relative to LIBOR such that
the present value of the cash flows using the discount
factors equals the price of the notes. The discount margin
can be obtained by solving the following equation.
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where A= accrued interest at settlement
C1= first coupon payment
dl= days to first coupon payment date from
settlement date
DM= discount margin
f= number of coupon fixes per year
h= (365.25/360) X (1/f)
La= average LIBOR assumed for the remaining life of
FRN
L*= LIBOR for period to the next coupon payment
date
n= number of complete coupon periods
P= spot price
S= spread over LIBOR
Other Factors Affecting FRN Prices
Undoubtedly, short-term interest rates are very
important in determining FRN prices. However, there are
still some factors that will affect the holders' and
sellers' evaluations of FRNs.
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For example, the quality and nature of the borrower
would affect the acceptance of the FRN both in the primary
market and the secondary market. The FRNs issued by high
quality borrowers would tend to be more accepted by
investors and have higher prices.
If the FRNs are traded mainly on the short-term
basis, then the effect of maturity is minimal. However,
there are still many investors such as banks who treat the
FRN as a long-term investment. In general, it is found
that the shorter the maturities, the more stable the
prices are. When the issues comes very close to maturity,
the prices get closer to par and the liquidity decreases.
There are FRNs with different periodicity of the
coupon payment. This factor would also be taken into
account by investors. A FRN with a shorter periodicity of
coupon payment, for example three months, would be more
stable in price due to the proximity of the next coupon
date so that the importance of the current coupon payment
decreases.
Other factors that will affect FRN prices include
coupon spread over LIBOR, syndicated loan conditions, call
options, sinking fund and issue size.
Notes:
1. This example is based on Floating Rate Notes by
Georges Ugeux, Ch.8
2. See Floating Rate Notes by Georges Ugeux, p.108
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CHAPTER V
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE FRN MARKET
Growth of the Market
World Markets
Back in the late sixties and early seventies, the
industrialized world was enjoying a period of prosperity
and growth. Many corporations resorted to borrowings to
support expansion while many governments also pursued
expansionary budget deficit policies. As a result, the
demand for loans increased remarkably.
Coupled with this favourable situation, however, were
the breakdown of the international monetary system, the
oil crisis and inflation, which brought about an increase
in volatility of interest rates. Investors responded by
investing in the short term.
While corporations were demanding medium and long
term funds, investors were only willing to supply money
short term. Banks, wanting to fulfil the needs of their
borrowers without taking an excessive interest rate risk,
had no better alternative but to lend their money at a
floating rate.
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Nevertheless, the floating rate concept was not
introduced to the bond market until 1970. At that time,
the yield curve had a negative slope. This reduced the
attractiveness of fixed rate bonds and investors were only
willing to place their money in short-term deposits.
Meanwhile, banks were saturated with huge amounts of oil
surpluses which also accumulated as short-term deposits.
Therefore, banks were rich in short-term money but short
in medium and long term funds. As a result, they were
reluctant to lend out money at medium and long term. The
FRN, being a medium and long term financing instrument but
at an interest rate that fluctuates with short term
interest rates, was naturally the 'ideal' alternative to
match the requirements of fund demanders and suppliers.
After its initial birth in the Eurobond market, the
FRN continued to grow steadily through the seventies and
early eighties. The impetus of its growth came from four
main factors: the high and volatile interest rates, the
active participation of the banks, the active
participation of sovereign borrowers, and the value of
FRNs as short-term investments.
In the years between 1974 and 1981, interest rates
tended to move in an extremely erratic and unpredictable
manner. Take the Eurodollar six-month LIBOR for example,
it varied from about 5% to 20%. This was largely caused
by the oil crises in-1973 and 1979, and also the budget
deficit policies adopted by many governments. In this
period of fierce inflation and unpredictable interest
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rates, investors found the FRN to be the most satisfactory
way to hedge financial assets against inflation. As a
result, the FRN was able to flourish. Appendix 3 gives a
diagram showing the fluctuations of LIBOR within the
period.
However, interest rates alone are not able to provide
a full explanation for the-steady growth of the FRN
market. If there had not been the participation of
international banks, the FRN would definitely not have
enjoyed such steady and prosperous growth. There were
several reasons for the banks to participate in the FRN
market.
(1) Stable Funding
For the major banks, availability of funds and
stabilization of funding were always considered more
important than the cost of funding. Although funding
could also be obtained through interbank operations or
deposits, these sources could suddenly dry up and were
thus unreliable. Therefore, major banks were willing to
pay a premium over the interbank rate to secure a stable
source of funds through issuing FRNs. In addition, FRNs,
as a medium-term funding, could protect the banks from the
risk of increased cost of funding, or even a liquidity
squeeze.
(2) Matching Assets and Liabilities
To reduce risk exposure to interest rate changes,
banks had to match their medium-term loan portfolio with
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medium term finance. Since corporate clients of the banks
had a constant demand for medium-term loans, the banks had
to fund these loans from FRNs to match them.
(3) Capital Base
In some countries, FRNs were regarded as part of the
capital base for banks. For example, a U.S. holding
company could issue a FRN and regard it as equity capital
if its retirement arrangements satisfied the relevant
banking regulations. Also, in the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and France, some bank perpetuals, which were
FRNs with no maturity, could be classified as primary
capital. This way of raising primary capital was clearly
cheaper than using alternative capital instruments because
it allowed the deduction of interest expense against
current earnings.
(4) Outlet for Funds
Banks participated actively not only on the borrowing
side, but also on the lending side. FRNs could also serve
as an attractive alternative outlet for funds as compared
to lending out in the interbank market. For those smaller
banks which were unable to participate in syndicated
loans, FRN5 gave them the opportunity to access- medium
term variable rate borrowings.-
(5) Marketability
FRNs, being marketable securities, were able to
provide greater. flexibility in asset management of banks.
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The third major boost to the FRN market was the
increased participation of sovereign borrowers. This
transformation in the FRN market took place in the early
eighties. In this period of recession, most banks-were
caught in both their corporate lending and their sovereign
lending to Latin America. This situation led the banks to
go after liquid and good quality assets. Sovereign
borrowers in the industrialized countries were naturally
the 'ideal' candidate for good quality borrowers while the
FRN was obviously the most liquid way of acquiring and
keeping quality assets. As a result, sovereign borrowers
could enjoy a very low cost of borrowing from FRNs. This
explained why the share of public sector in. the FRN
market jumped from only 7.5% in 1970-79 to 43% in the
1980s.
Fourthly, the growth of the FRN market in 1985 was
partly due to the changing value of FRNs as 'a viable
alternative to a cash deposit. By having a longer
maturity and a higher risk on the principal. amount,
interest on FRNs is always higher than bank deposits.
Also, an environment of falling interest rates and a flat
to negative yield curve attracted many investors to buy
FRNs even when funding at a loss, in the hope of capital
appreciation.
The Hong Kona Market
The issuing and trading activities of FRNs in Hong
Kong is largely influenced by the situation and sentiment
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of the world markets. However, being a relatively small
and less mature economy, Hong Kong has its particular
characteristics regarding to the development of its FRN
market.
The Hong Kong Dollar FRN market can be characterized
by its small number of total issues, high denominations,
inactive trading, and the relative absence of banks as
borrowers. Appendix 4 gives a detailed list of HK dollar
FRNs issued within the period 1984 to 1987.
The FRN concept was first adopted by Hong Kong
corporations in 1981, as Hong Kong was gradually emerging
as one of the world's.leading financial centres. Compared
to the U.S. and Euro markets, the FRN had a delayed start
in' Hong Kong because of the relative immaturity of Hong
Kong's financial infra-structure.
Limited by the size of Hong Kong's economy, most FRNs
issued by Hong Kong corporations had a smaller amount per
issue than in the Euromarket. The typical amount per
issue for Hong Kong dollar FRNs is HK$500 million while
that for US dollar FRNs in the Euromarket is around US$100.
million (i.e. about HK$800 million). In addition, because
of the 3-tier banking structure in Hong. Kong, the Hong
Kong Association of Banks had a code of practice
prescribing high denominations for debt instruments.
This, combined with the cost concerns with the management
of large volumes of small denomination notes, had resulted
in typical denominations of HK$500,000 per note for HK
dollar issues. In the Euromarket, a FRN is typically
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denominated in US$1,000 only.
The small amount per issue and high denomination for
HK$ FRNs imply that the number of notes per issue is much
smaller than in the Euromarket. This seriously affects
the liquidity of the instrument in Hong Kong, which in
turn further scares some investors away. Perhaps this
explains why the HK dollar FRN market is so small.
However, this does not imply that the FRN did not
have substantial growth in Hong Kong over the years. In
fact, from 1984 to 1986, the total issuance volume of HK
dollar FRN had grown from HK$500 million to HK$3,850
million. Table 5.1 gives the details:
m, b,1 5 1 NmhAr of -sues and volume of HK$ FRN market





One factor that caused this growth was the keen
competition among the banks for investment opportunities.
Being saturated with an abundant supply of funds, banks
were competing with one another to lend• money to
borrowers. In order to attract borrowers, they might
suggest that their customers raise funds through FRNs.
Usually, terms that were better than straight loans were
granted and innovations were attached to suit the specific
needs of the borrowers. In this way, the issuing of a FRN
was in fact a disguised bank loan. Therefore, it is not
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surprising to find that most of the FRNs issued were kept
by the banks themselves. As for the borrowers, they were
glad to accept such arrangements, as long as they could
achieve a lower cost of funding.
Another factor that contributed to the growth of the
Hong Kong dollar FRN market was the active participation
of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). Since its
establishment, the MTRC has been relying heavily on
borrowing to cover its general funding needs or to
refinance its•previous debts. Being backed by the Hong
Kong Government and having a stable stream of cash inflow,
the MTRC has been a reputable sovereign borrower with a
good credit standing. In order to diversify its source of
funds so that its long term cost of borrowing can be kept
at a minimum, the MTRC was willing to try out different
innovations in the capital market, including the FRN. For
example, in April 1986, it issued a HK$500 million FRN
with the 'Minimax' concept. In July, 1986, the MTRC
issued a HK$420 million conventional FRN and HK$330
million' 'Bull FRN' to achieve fixed rate financing. In
October 1986, it issued a US$85 million FRN in Europe,
with warrants attached for HK$663 million inverse FRNs.
These concepts have enabled the MTRC to access corporate
funds that were otherwise not accessible.
As was the case for the international FRN market,
FRNs became more and more popular in Hong Kong as banks
increasingly wanted to generate fee-based business and
also pursued flexibility in their asset and liability
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management.
Secondary market trading in HK dollar FRNs or FRNs
issued by Hong Kong corporations is limited and therefore
FRNS are considered to be illiquid. It is estimated that
at least 75% of investors in FRNS are banks with only 25%
being end-investors. Most of these investors are for
long-term holding. However, some banks may also treat
FRNs as short-term investments and get involved in the
trading of FRNS. These banks usually create a FRN
portfolio-which they finance through interbank borrowings.
In this way, they aim at getting a profit from the spread
above the interbank markets. Furthermore, FRNs with
mismatch features tended to have added attraction to these
banks when the yield curve had a steep and positive slope.
For example, the HK$400 million mismatched.FRN issued by
Sun Hung Kai Properties in September 1987 was typically
geared to this type of investor. The notes commanded an
annual interest rate of 0.0625% over three-month HIBOR
while payment rates would be adjusted monthly. In this
way, many banks could fund their purchase of the notes at
one-month HIBOR while receiving three-month HIBOR. They
could make a profit as long as the one-month rate remained
below the three-month level. Other investors use FRNs as
hedging or speculating instruments because the coupon rate
for a FRN is usually fixed for a short period of time (one
rn nf-_ i-rPP months or six month- q) hPfnrP_ it i s -refixed.
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Decline of the FRN Market
World Markets
The FRN began to decline in 1986. However, before
that year there had been considerable transformation
taking place in the market. Tensions had been built up
from many areas.
The first threat to the FRN market was the decline of
interest rates. Starting from 1982, when the U.S. and
Western European governments had adopted anti-inflationary
policies, the world suddenly went into the deepest
recession since the Second World War. This led to a
substantial decrease in interest rates. As a result, the
attractiveness of FRNs was reduced. Appendix 5 shows the
fluctuations of six-month LIBOR for the period 1980-
1984.
The second problem was the competition of the swap
market. Using interest rate swaps, banks might obtain
medium and long term funding through interest rate swaps
at a cheaper cost than FRNs. To achieve this cost
advantage, many banks tapped. the fixed rate bond markets
and then swapped the borrowed amounts into floating rate.
As banks used to be major participants in the FRN market,
their switch to alternative instruments naturally retarded
the growth of the FRN.
The third factor that weakened the position of. the
FRN market came from'the international debt crisis. The
estimated global LDC debt in 1988 is US$1,245 billion. As
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at end of March 1988, the top three debtor countries:
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina had a total external debt of
US$269 billion. The economic situations in these
countries are so discouraging that they either try to
reschedule their debt repayments or even cease to pay
interest. Since most of these debt claims are held by
banks, the failure to service debt from these countries
seriously affects the credit quality of the banks. As a
result investors have become very aware of the risk
inherent in holding bank issued FRNs. This has led to a
reduction in investors' appetites for bank FRNs and a
substantial selling pressure in the secondary market.
Fourth, the over-supply and over-competition in the
FRN market also tended to worsen the decline. In 1986,
there. were many issues of FRNs which tried to take
advantage of the investors' appetites for FRNs as money
market instruments. Competition among banks and
securities houses was so keen that large amounts of paper
were issued at increasingly lower spreads and longer
maturities. At that time, FRNs issued by top quality
sovereign borrowers were traded at discount margins of
twenty basis points below LIBOR. However, when interest
rates stopped declining and the yield curve remained flat,
the FRN was no more an attractive short term investment
to investors. However, new issues continued to pour into
the market. As a result, underwriters were left with
large inventories of'unplaced paper.1
Finally, the collapse of the perpetual sector of the
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FRN market in December 1986 was a strong blow to
investors' confidence in the liquidity of the FRN market.
It seems that the perpetual FRN had grown under an
atmosphere where its investors did not realize fully the
risks involved in such instruments. However, in autumn
1986, when some high-margin, asset-backed, AAA-rated FRNs
were brought to the market at a substantial margin over
LIBOR, investors suddenly realized that the low margins
attached to previous perpetuals were insufficient to
reflect the higher risks inherent in this concept.
Consequently, a large sell-off occurred, which eventually
led to the suspension of trading by many market makers on
December 3,- 1986. In January 1987, the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board and the Bank of England reached an agreement
on proposed common capital adequacy rules for banks.
These new rules would require banks holding subordinated
debt of other banks, including perpetuals, to deduct such
holdings from their own primary capital. Selling pressure
further intensified as a result. Perpetual prices went
down to as low as 15% below par. On many. occasions, this
multi-billion-dollar market had to come to a halt because
nobody was willing to buy. Many banks were stuck with
huge volumes of unsellable papers.2 This liquidity crisis
has affected investors' confidence about other types of
FRNs and led to sell-offs in these instruments as well.
The FRN, being a concept that typically lives on its
liquidity, seemed to'have lost its attractiveness relative
to other borrowing or investment alternatives in this
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'liquidity test' of the market. Appendix 6 shows the
changes in FRN prices for the period 11 April 1986- 22
May 1987.
The Hong Kong Market
Borrowers' interest in tapping the FRN market in Hong
Kong was definitely affected by the world market situation
and the prevailing sentiment. Therefore, when the FRN was
suffering from heavy selling pressure and reduced issues
everywhere, there was no exception for the Hong Kong
market.
However, because there are not any perpetual FRN in
Hong Kong and most of the FRN investors are for long-term
holding, the impairment of value of the Hong Kong FRNs has
not been as serious as those in other markets.
To a certain extent, apart from influence from the
world markets, the decline of the Hong Kong FRN market is
somewhat predictable. Since Hong Kong is just a
relatively small economy, the real borrowing demand in the
form of FRNs is limited. On the one hand, there are not-
many corporations in Hong Kong that have the credit
standing required for securitizing their debts. On the
other hand, since diversification of borrowing sources is
an important objective for major Hong Kong FRN issuers
such as the MTRC, these corporations may not like to tap
the same source too frequently, though market conditions
might seem favourable. In addition, because of the small
investor base in Hong Kong, the appetite for holding FRNs
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can easily be satisfied. Knowing this, both potential
borrowers and the banks have become very cautious about
introducing new FRN issues to avoid an over-supply of
paper.
Another factor that caused the decline of the Hong
Kong FRN market was the exceptionally low interest rates
in Hong Kong. Since October 1983, Hong Kong has adopted
the Linked Exchange Rate System, pegging the Hong Kong
dollar to the value of the U.S. dollar. With the
weakening of the U.S. dollar, the Hong Kong interest rates
had to be readjusted downwards from. time to time to
maintain the Linked Exchange Rate. After the worldwide
stock market crash on 19 October, 1987, the U.S. dollar
came to such a weak point that many investors were
speculating on an upward adjustment of Hong Kong dollars
in the Linked Exchange Rate System. To deter the inflow
of these speculative funds, Hong Kong interest rates have
been reduced five times between October 1987 and January
1988 and the Government finally had to consider the
possibility of imposing negative interest rates. As of 15.
February, 1988, the six-month HIBOR was only about 3%.
The low interest rates, combined with a flight of`- funds
towards certainty in income after the stock market crash,
have favoured the development. of fixed rate instruments
rather than floating rate ones, including the FRN.
Appendix 7 gives the fluctuations in three-month HIBOR and




1. The discussion on the over-supply and over-competition
in the FRN market is adapted from a research report,
'Floating Rate Notes- A Time to Buy', by Morgan
Guaranty Ltd.
2. The discussion on the collapse of the perpetual sector
is adapted from a research report, 'The Valuation of
Perpetuals', by Morgan Guaranty Ltd.
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CHAPTER VI
REPACKAGING OF THE FRN
In order to restore liquiaity to the FRN market so
that the huge volume of paper held by the banks can be
absorbed, many issues of FRNs, especially the perpetuals,
have undergone a repackaging process in which innovations
were attached to these FRNs to stimulate investor demands.
One possible repackaging innovation is attaching a
zero coupon bond onto the perpetual. A fixed maturity is
then assigned to the package. Over the life of the
package, investors can receive the yield from the
perpetual. Upon termination of the package, the zero
coupon bond will then pay the investors a fraction of the
perpetual's face value. The investors will also have the
benefit of additional profit should the perpetual have a.
good value at the end of the package's life.
Another type of repackaging is- to create two
instruments to replace the perpetual. One is a dated FRN
which pays higher margins than the original perpetual over
the life of the package. The second part is a Future
Perpetual, which entitles its holder to receive the
original perpetual at the end of the-life of the package.
A third way to repackage perpetuals is to swap these
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with LDC loans.
So far some successful repackagings of perpetuals
have established a base value for this.kind of instrument
and partially alleviated the liquidity problem in the
market. For example, in March 1987, a repackaging of a
US$130 million part of the $500 million Westpac Banking
Corporation Perpetual engineered by J.P. Morgan has been
so successful that prices of the perpetuals received good
support at levels over 80% of face value.
Note:
1. The ideas discussed in this chapter are largely
abstracted from a research report, 'The Valuation of
Perpetuals', by Morgan Guaranty Ltd.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE FRr
World Markets
In the immediate future, the prospects of the FRN in
the international security market depend greatly upon its
liquidity. Liquidity was the factor that has enabled the
FRN to prosper in the past relative to its near
competitor, the syndicated loan. Without liquidity, there
will not be any substantial difference between the two
alternatives. Under this situation, potential borrowers
would undoubtedly go to the syndicated loan because of its
flexibility.
Since the collapse of the perpetual sector of the FRN
in December 1986, investors have been aware of how fragile-
the liquidity of negotiable financial assets could become
and doubt was cast on the capability of-trading houses to
maintain an orderly market.
Fortunately, the market has seen some improvements.
First, market conditions have now greatly limited the
supply of new paper.. A number of issues have been called
or locked away to maturity via asset swaps or
repackagings. Secondly, successful repackagings of FRNs
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have demonstrated to investors the base value of FRNs.
These two factors tend to produce good support for the
prices of FRNs and enhance the liquidity of FRNs in the
secondary market.
In the longer term, the future direction of interest
rate changes definitely has a great impact on the rise and
fall of FRNs. With the U.S. presidential election ahead
in November 1988 and a fear of recession, most central
banks in the industrialized countries will try their best
to keep the interest rate at a low level during 1988.
However, if the U.S. dollar should continue to fall,
inflation may worsen and force the Federal Reserve to
pursue an anti-inflationary policy. Interest rates will
then increase again. With that kind of interest rate
environment, FRNs will become an attractive investment for
traditional hedging activities. The yield curve would
become positive again, enabling investors to fund their
purchases of FRNs advantageously.
As existing financing alternatives such as syndicated
loans and revolving underwriting facilities (RUF) would
continue to compete with FRNs in-the debt market, new
developments in another concept, the,Transferablja Loan
Certificate (TLC), will surely pose an increased threat to
FRNs. A TLC is an instrument used to securitize a loan
transaction so that transfer of loan assets between
financial institutions can be simplified. Using the TLC,
a bank which has a good debt origination capability but
does not want to keep the loan asset on its own balance
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sheet can always arrange a loan and then sell it to other
banks. This gives a bank loan marketability, which
resembles FRNs. Moreover, a syndicated loan combined with
a TLC can result in a lower cost and higher fiexibility
than a FRN.
Finally, it must be noted that the international
security markets, especially the Euro-market, have been
cradles of successful innovations. There have been many
examples to show that even small innovations can make a
declining instrument revive. In this way, it is thus fair
to say that the future of the FRN at least partially
depends on the vitality of the markets.
The Hong Kong Market
In the immediate future, the liquidity problem
experienced in the world markets definitely will affect
both the primary and secondary activities of local FRNs.
It seems that time is needed for investors to recover
their confidence in the market.
Apart from this, another imminent threat arises from
the artificially low interest rates due to the pegging of
the local currency with the weakening US dollar. This,
combined with a flight of investors' capital out of the
stock market after its crash in October 1987, has led to a
tremendous growth of fixed rate CDs in Hong Kong in early
1988.
As a matter of fact, the popularity of CDs has always
54
far exceeded that of FRNs in Hong Kong. by issuing ixeu
rate CDs and then swapping into floating rate, banks and
deposit taking companies can always obtain stable medium
term funds at sub-HIBOR rates. This is clearly superior to
the FRN as its cost of fund is usually above HIBOR. Even
when there is not a need for funds, fixed rate CDs will
still be issued as banks try to help corporate borrowers
shift their exposure from floating to fixed rate through
swap arrangements. To investors, Hong Kong dollar fixed
rate CDs bear extra attraction because they are free from
any withholding tax. As for FRNs, the withholding tax is
not exemptible.
However, this does not imply that the FRN will
decline indefinitely. Should the US dollar fall further
relative to other major currencies, the resulting
inflationary pressure will most probably lead to a rise in
interest rates. Pressure for the Hong Kong dollar to be
revaluated against the US dollar will also intensify.
Under those circumstances, the FRN may regain its vitality
again.
In the long run, the-prospects of the FRN in Hong
Kong depend greatly on the development of.. the local.
financial infra-structure. As a debt security, the FRN is
currently subjected to a number of obstacles that other
bond type instruments are suffering.
The first major obstacle is the lack of Government
support for debt securities. The participation of the
Government in a bond market is of immense importance to
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its development. Government bonds tend to be very popular
because they posses many attractive features: redemption
by the Government, nearly zero degree of risk, statutory
liquid asset, steady returns and a high degree of
liquidity.
However, since the Hong Kong Government has always
followed a balanced budget financing, the issuing of
government bonds has been kept to a minimum. In fact, the
Hong Kong Government so far has only issued bonds during
the fiscal years 75/76 and 84/85. This clearly indicates
the lack of interest on the part of the Hong Kong
Government to support an in-depth bond market.
If the Hong Kong Government would issue bonds on a
constant basis, its new issues could serve as a frame of
reference for the pricing of debt securities by
corporations. Without this, these corporations are forced
to forecast the trends of market interest rates by
themselves, thus raising more difficulties and risks in
issuing new debt securities.
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that although the
Hong Kong Government has not been active in issuing debt
securities, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation and the
Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, in which the
Government has substantial equity positions, are important
participants in the local debt market.
In addition, Mr. David Nendick, the Secretary for
Monetary Affairs, revealed in mid-January 1988 that the
Government is now considering the issue of short-term
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bonds. If this intention is put into effect, there will
be a definite boost to the FRN as well as to other capital
market instruments.
The second deficiency in the Hong Kong financial
system is the lack of a rating system. For securities, it
is always desirable for investors to have information on
the credit worthiness of the issuing corporations so that
they can make investment decisions. However, due to the
high degree of professional knowledge involved, the cost
of getting this information may be great. In many
sophisticated markets, a standard rating system such as
Standard Poor's debt ratings or Moody's bond ratings is
always used so that investors can conveniently obtain
information about the risks related to a certain bond. But
in Hong Kong, no rating system has ever been established.
Even though all locally issued financial instruments have
to satisfy the minimum statutory requirements, and must be
approved by the Securities Commission, the credit
reputation and business performance of the issuing
corporations still may vary greatly. Consequently, without
a good measurement of credit-quality and risk, corporate
bond issuers can only be. those very reputable and-
financially sound enterprises. That certainly limits the
number of qualified borrowers which.can tap the local FRN
market.
Another obstacle is the high denominations required
by the Association of Banks for Hong Kong dollar bonds.
Taking the Hong Kong dollar FRN for example, nearly all
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previous issues were in the HK$500,000 denomination. The
possible reasons for this may be to reduce management
costs for bond issues and to protect commercial banks' as
well as the small investors' interests. The consequence is
that few investors can afford to invest in FRNs. This
tends to limit the size of the investor base, which in
turn hampers the growth of the local FRN market.
The Hong Kong tax system is also one source of
hindrance to the development of securities such as FRNs.
At present, private investors have to pay a 17%
withholding tax on interest income from bonds.
Unless some breakthrough can be made to eliminate the
above obstacles, the development prospects of FRNs and




Although FRNs have been around for about two decades
in the international bond market, its introduction into
the Hong Kong market happened only a few years ago. Since
then, its local development has been closely affected by
what is taking place throughout the world market.
While volatility in interest rates, the international
debt crisis,- the world-wide trend of securitization, and
changing banking regulations have often been cited as the
major driving forces behind the development of the world
FRN market, its growth in Hong Kong tends to be based on
the high economic growth of the economy, the increasingly
sophisticated local financial system, the banks' use of
FRNs as disguised loans, and the participation of public
corporations such as the Mass Transit Railway Corporation.
The FRN is attractive to borrowers because it'enables
them to raise medium and long term funds in an inexpensive
way. It is relatively cheaper and normally enjoys a longer
maturity than its alternative- the syndicated loan,
though the syndicated loan is more flexible. Some banks
issue FRNs because banking regulations permit them to use
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this cheaper means to raise primary capital. Some
corporate borrowers tap this market to diversify their
borrowings in order to keep down the long-term borrowing
costs.
For investors, FRNs can be used as short term and
long term investments. Investing in FRNs is a particularly
good hedge against inflation. Some banks buy and hold
FRNs because they want to gain access to good quality and
liquid assets or to earn a spread over interbank rates by
maintaining a FRN portfolio through interbank borrowings.
Persistently low and declining interest rates, the
over-supply of FRNs due to intense competition among
banks, the collapse of the perpetual sector, and the
worsening of the international debt crisis were the major
causes of the downturn to the world FRN markets. This, in
turn, affected the local market sentiment. In addition,
the Hong Kong market was further aggravated by the
artificially low interest rates as a result of the linking
of the Hong Kong dollar to the weakening US dollar,
especially after Black Monday on October 19, 1987. The
saturation of the small local market demand for FRNs also
led to a sharp reduction in new issues.
Looking to the future, further development of the FRN
is limited because of the liquidity concern of investors
on the market, the lack of government support, the absence
of a rating system, the small local investor base, the
Linked Exchange Rate System, high denominations required
for debt securities, and the necessity for the noteholders
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to pay a 17% withholding tax on the interest earned. No
substantial advancement of the local FRN market can be
expected without the emergence of a more favourable
infra-structure.
However, with a continually strong local economy, the
gradual restoration of investors' confidence in the market
and a possible return of rising interest rates, the FRN
will surely remain as an unforgettable instrument in the




Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd.'- Miss Michelle Chang
Mass Transit Railway Corporation
- Mr. C.R. Moss, Finance Director
Mr. Jeffrey Cheung, Treasurer
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Sanwa International Finance Ltd
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Standard Chartered Asis Limited- Miss Agnes Choi
Wardly Capital Limited
Only a telephone interview was conducted.
Only a research report was obtained from this source.
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APPENDIX 4
HK DOLLAR FRN ISSUES 1984- 1987
AMOUNT TERMSDATE ISSUER
3K$ mil)
5009/84 Mass Transit Railway 8 years
3-month HIBORCorporation
+ 1/4% p.a.
2003/85 Daewoo Industrial Co. 5 years
3-month HIBOR(HK) Ltd.-
+ 1/4% p.a.
3605/85 Arab Banking Corporation 5 years
3-month HIBOR
+ 1/4% p.a.








7 years 'Minimax'4/86 Mass Transit Railway (i) 5.00
Corporation Min 7.5% p.a.
Max 12% P.a.
put/call year 5





7/86 Sun Hung Kai 500 7 years
Properties Ltd. 3-month HIBOR
+ 1/4%
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APPENDIX 6
CHANGES IN FRN PRICES 11 APRIL 1986- 22 MAY 1987
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1966 1987
FRNS (average of 4 issues)
Perpetuals (average of 4 liquid issues)
Source: adapted from report from J.P Morgan Research
The Valuation of Perpetuals', July 1987, p.5
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